The Devil and the Deep Blue Sea

On the morning of 30 April, 1915, after refitting an exhaust tank valve, AE2 began her journey to Kara Burnu Point, where she planned to rendezvous with submarine E14 [AWM: 36/49]. There is some uncertainty about whether AE2 sighted E14[1], but what is certain is that her Commander, Lieutenant Commander Henry (H.G.D) Stoker noticed a Turkish torpedo boat approaching from the west. As AE2 dived to avoid the torpedo boat, she suffered a loss of control when her “nose suddenly rose” and she broke surface. [AWM: 36/49]. Stoker gave the order to flood the forward ballast tank after which “the boat took a sudden inclination by the bows and dived rapidly.” [AWM: 36/49]. In his memoir, Henry (J.E.) Kinder recalled the drama that followed, as the crew fought to regain control of the boat:

The Captain ordered full speed ahead on the motors and the hydroplanes hard to rise but the boat made no response but kept sinking by the bows until AE2 was nearly on beams end. It was impossible to stand on the deck, the crew had to get their feet on some of the side fixtures with their backs against the deck to carry out the orders and to make matters worse everything moveable in the bow started to slide and roll to the bows and some of the heavier things such as boxes of spanners took some dodging and it sounded like bedlam had been let loose. It was hard to hear the orders above the noise of breaking crockery, mess tins and the rest of the moving articles. The main diving gauges had got beyond registering depth, orders were carried out with great difficulty owing to the awful angle of the boat. [AWM: PR01466]

Only by going full speed astern and blowing all ballast tanks could the dive be arrested. On surfacing by the stern, out of trim, AE2 was attacked. Another dive was promptly ordered, but with an even worse outcome, as the boat’s “inclination down by bow grew bigger”. [AWM: 36/49] In waters estimated to be 240 feet deep [AWM: PR01466], well in excess of AE2's maximum operating depth, Stoker knew that failing to arrest the descent would likely result in catastrophe. On the other hand, forcing her to the surface would put her at the mercy of her Turkish pursuers. In a case of what Kinder described as ‘the devil and the deep blue sea’, [AWM: PR01466] Stoker chose to blow AE2’s ballast tanks and throw the motors into full reverse once again. Kinder recalled:

This time on AE2 breaking surface the Turkish destroyer was so close it was practically impossible for them to miss the stern of AE2 which was well out of the water. The German gunner managed to get three shells through the hull and water began to poor into the engine room, but the Captain had already given the order to flood the tanks and AE2 had started to submerge for the third time. Word was passed to the Captain that there were several holes in the hull and water began to poor into the engine room and if we didn’t get AE2 to the surface we were caught. The water tight door leading to the engine room was closed after a hard struggle owing to the angle of the boat and the engine room was isolated. All the available air was turned on so the pressure could be maintained to get the water out of the tanks as quickly as possible. [AWM: PR01466]

With the depth gauge registering 60 then 80 feet, anxiety grew:

“If any of the water pouring into the engine room came in contact with the motors and short circuited them, it would be all up, as the motors were working far beyond their safety load and the electricians were standing by with fuses in case the others blew out. But I think it would have been useless as AE2 was just holding her own and a lot depended on whether the water was being blown faster than it was pouring into the engine room. The boat was vibrating so much it seemed as though she would shake to pieces.” [AWM: PR01466]

AE2 broke the surface for the last time. In his official account, Stoker noted that due to the inclination of boat, it was impossible to see the Turkish torpedo boat through the periscope, leaving AE2 entirely defenceless. Stoker gave the order to abandon ship. [AWM: 36/49]

Picture of Commander Stoker
Stoker: Loss of Submarine AE2, Sea of Marmara, April 30, 1915
[AWM: 36/49]
Picture of Henry James Elly Kinder
Henry Kinder: Loss of Submarine AE2 & Prisoners of War
[AWM: PR01466]
Picture of Able Seaman John Harrison Wheat
John Harrison : Loss of Submarine AE2 & Prisoners of War
[AWM: 3DRL/2695]

In his official account of the mission written in 1919, he could provide no explanation of the original loss of trim by the submarine but likened it to a similar case involving submarine E11 under the command of Lieutenant Commander Nasmith. [AWM: 36/49] It took some time for news of the loss of AE2 to reach Australia. On 12 May, 1915, the Naval Board in Melbourne became aware of a “Press Cable” originating in London – it contained a startling message. In response, a cable was sent to the Admiralty the same day. It read:

“URGENT. Press Cable states A.E.2 sunk in Sea of Marmara and Crew taken prisoners. Have stopped publication. Please inform if true.” [NAA: MP472/1, 5/19/2520]

On the following day the Naval Board received a reply. The source of the startling news was a “Turkish Official Communiqué” claiming that AE2 had been destroyed and that her officers and men had been taken as prisoners. The Admiralty admitted it had approved the message for publication, but added that its substance was presently unconfirmed. [NAA: MP472/1, 5/19/2520] With no communication from AE2 since 26 April; Admiralty reluctantly concluded in a cable sent to the Navy Office, Melbourne on 18 May that “her loss must be presumed.” [NAA: MP472/1, 5/19/2520]

By now, news – either officially or unofficially – had reached relatives of AE2's crew. Next of kin were sent letters informing them of content found in the “Turkish report”. Concerned, relatives wrote to the Navy Office asking to be kept informed – it was a time of uncertainty and worry for them. [NAA: MP472/1, 5/19/2520] James Kerin, who believed his brother Leading Stoker John Kerin was a member of AE2’s crew, wrote:

“Sir, I respectfully ask if you could inform me whether the account which appeared in papers regarding the AE2 Submarine being captured at the “Dardenelles” has since been confirmed officially or denied as being correct...my brother is a member of the crew of this boat & the reports have caused considerable anxiety to his relatives. Trusting to hear the true facts “if any” are available.” [NAA: MP472/1, 5/19/2520]

How many of the crew had survived to become Prisoners Of War (POWs) was unclear to British and Australian authorities. The British Foreign Office made a request to the American Ambassador in Constantinople for the exact figure. Finally, on 9 June, a list of AE2 crew captured became available. The American Ambassador reported that “3 Officers and 29 men were saved from Submarine A.E.2. This is total number...therefore all have been saved.” This information was immediately conveyed to next of kin. [NAA: MP472/1, 5/19/2520]

There were a number of Allied POW camp locations throughout Turkey:

Picture of POW camps (Asia Minor and Mesopotamia)

POW camps (Asia Minor and Mesopotamia) [NAA: MP472/1, 5/18/9207]

The POW experience could differ markedly between the various camps. A British Foreign Office memorandum to the Netherlands Minister in Constantinople, dated 25 April, 1918, included a broad statement of camp conditions:

“The conditions in various camps of internment in Turkey appear to vary considerably. In some they appear not to be intolerable, where, for instance, men are able to earn working pay wherewith to supplement their rations. In others the state of the prisoners seems to be desperate, and men are dying for lack of nourishment.”[NAA: MP472/1, 5/19/2520]

Able Seaman John H. Wheat speaks of a range of camps in his diary: there were “rest” camps which were tolerable , like the one he experienced at Bor in 1917: “free from vermin and we enjoyed the luxury of plenty of baths,” and “good water” to wash clothes in. But there were also railway and other work camps. These were places of hard manual labour over long hours. Finally, there were “punishment” camps like that at “Bazardjite” where some POWs were sent for refusing to work – here, the POWs had “very little sleep”, while the work was “extremely hard and hours alarming”. Stoker Michael W. Williams spent some time at Bazardjite during 1916. No matter which camp they found themseves in, there would always be the daily routine of life in captivity. For the the crew of AE2, it was an existence punctuated by periods of monotony, long hours of work, cramped quarters, presence of vermin, feelings of hunger, and perhaps the personal experience of sickness and disease. [AWM: 3DRL/2965]

Some AE2 POW personal accounts describe how POW treatment could depend on the demeanour of German and Turkish authorities. In 1918, Wheat observed a difference in camp conditions at Afion Kara Hissar compared with his first period of internment in 1915: it had become a “fairly good rest camp under the new Commandant”. Able Seaman Alexander Nichols recalled a series of camp commandants while at St. Stefano in 1917-1918: “Conditions improved” after the German commandant was replaced by a Turkish one; however, this situation did not last too long and once again a German was given command of the POW camp. He was “very good” to the POWs at first, but this changed dramatically after “his brother was killed fighting against British Troops in France; he then turned on us”. [AWM: 3DRL/2965] Stoker Petty Officer Henry Kinder found corruption at Afion Kara Hissar’s in 1915: “we heard a rumour that the Commandant was swelling his bank account at our expense”. There were times when AE2 POW complaints were listened to and attempts made to address them; but at other times, they “fell on deaf ears”. [AWM: PR01466]

Picture of Navy office file on AE2
Navy Office file on submarine AE2, 1915-1919
[NAA: MP472/1, 5/19/2520]
Picture of the regulations and notes for the help or relatives and friends
Regulations and notes for the help or relatives and friends, August 1918
[NAA: MP472/1, 5/18/9207]
Picture of the release of prisoners of war Navy office file
Release of Prisoners of War - Crew of Submarine AE2
[NAA: MP472/1, 5/19/2825]

The crew of AE2 crew experienced a number of POW camps during the period of their captivity. Wheat detailed several common reasons for prisoner movement between camps including work on both civil and military-orientated projects; punishment and rest periods; and detention following a failed escape. [AWM: 3DRL/2965] By war’s end, the AE2 POWs were by no means a single group located at one camp. Though the American Ambassador in Constantinople, the Australian Naval Representative (London) attempted to get a series of questions answered concerning the AE2 POWs. Efforts were made to ensure the health and well being of prisoners, inclusive of basic necessities such as food and clothing and access to money. Attempts were also made to establish arrangements for communication enabling prisoners to stay in contact with family and support groups. [NAA: MP472/1, 5/19/2520]

At various times during their captivity, the AE2 POWs were to find the food unpalatable, lacking nourishment, and inadequate. When given the opportunity complaints were made, particularly about the lack of meat. [AWM: 3DRL/2965] In Kinder’s opinion, “hunger was to be our biggest enemy in Turkey.” [AWM: PR01466] The lack of adequate amounts of nutritious food to sustain men during long periods of manual labour became a critical issue for the AE2 POWs. By early 1916, many were involved in building sections of the Baghdad Railway. Wheat recalled the long work hours and that the food was “very scanty and poor” while working at Gelebek in 1917. In such a situation POWs were susceptible to sickness and disease: all four AE2 POW deaths occurred during 1916 during typhus and malaria outbreaks, while working in railway labour camps in the Belemedik/Pozanti region.[2] Wheat lamented of his time at Gelebek: “Many, many nights we went to our dug outs – no hut or tents were given – hungry and done up. Very soon 15 out of our 25 had to be carried to the hospital near by, too ill and weak” to work any longer. [AWM: 3DRL/2965]

Very soon after their arrival at Afion Kara Hissar in May 1915, Stoker wrote to naval authorities requesting money so that his men had the means to supplement their existing food intake. The Australian Naval Representative (London) reported to the Naval Board on 17 June, 1915:

“Lieut. Commander Stoker reports by letter 15 May all Officers and Men A.E.2 in good health. He states that it will greatly make for comfort Petty Officers and men if arrangements can be made to send them sums of money say £5 per man, as they get no pay from Turkish government, but have opportunity to purchase extra food, really a necessity.” [NAA: MP472/1, 5/19/2520]

Working out satisfactory payment arrangements for AE2 POWs was a priority. Official naval payments – a total of £11 over two payments organised through the American Ambassador in Constantinople – were received by the men in 1915. [NAA: MP472/1, 5/19/2520] These early payments were welcomed. Kinder later confessed that “We had little English money when captured ... I had 10 shillings”. [AWM: PR01466] By September 1915, Wheat claimed that, “At this time we are all just about on the rocks for money.” [AWM: 3DRL/2965] In his diary Wheat remembered the first two payments made in 1915: while acknowledging receipt of the second payment he gave praise to the efforts of the Australian Naval Representative – the men received £5 from the ‘Australian O.C. in London. Up to this time there was no Red Cross to “mother” us, but the O.C. proved a good step-father to the A.E 2 lads.’ [AWM 3DRL/2965] The Australian Naval Representative (London) kept the Naval Board apprised of payments involving AE2 POWs: reports from both mid-1916 and early 1917 indicate that advances of pay calculated “at the rate of 30/-s per month” had been sent “at periodical intervals” to them. [NAA: MP472/1, 5/19/2520] The prisoners did receive other sources of income, but these could be sporadic and dependant on circumstances: some work duties were paid and some were not. Those AE2 POWs working on railway construction at Bilemedik during 1916, for instance, could earn wages ranging from “1/4 to 2/-” per day; however, the expectation was that food would be bought from this wage. [AWM: 3DRL/2965]

The buying power of this money was diminished somewhat by the prevailing economic conditions in Turkey. By early 1918, the British Government acknowledged it was looking for ways to alleviate “the hardships suffered by British prisoners of war in Turkey”; one consideration was payment to POWs “in kind, owing to the small value of Turkish paper money.” [NAA: MP472/1, 5/19/2520] In his 25 October, 1916 report to the Naval Board, the Australian Naval Representative stated that he had received twenty requests for food from AE2 POWs owing to the fact “that food is very expensive and difficult to obtain”. [NAA: MP472/1, 5/19/2520]

Naval authorities organised a plan to send monthly food parcels to the AE2 POWs. By early 1917, the Naval Board approved a scheme which saw the AE2 POWs being added to an existing list of Australian POWs being sent food parcels by the London office of the British Red Cross Society. This enabled them to both supplement their diet and to have regular access to food and drink items not readily available in Turkey. [NAA: MP472/1, 5/19/2520] Having returned to the POW camp at Afion Kara Hissar for the second time in May 1918, Wheat commented that the food had not changed for the better, it was “as per usual”; however, “the money we were receiving and a few Red Cross parcels enabled us to have at least one good meal a day.” [AWM: 3DRL/2965]

Opening up communication with Allied POWs in Turkey through the postal system was an important consideration for officials. Efforts to this end were organised by the British Foreign Office; the Navy Office, Melbourne was informed by cable on 25 June 1915 that parcels and letters destined for Allied POWs would be forwarded by the GPO in London. [NAA: MP472/1, 5/19/2520] However, sources allude to slow delivery to Allied POWs in Turkey. In a November 1915 report to the Navy Office on POW money matters, the Australian Naval Representative (London) acknowledged difficulty in getting communications to and from the AE2 POWs. Wheat speaks of two mail deliveries for 1915; a prolonged transit time is clear from his comments: on 2 August “we received a big batch of letters ... All old letters, some written long before we were captured”; it was not until 30 December that Wheat could acknowledge the receipt of his “first mail for over 8 months”. [AWM 3DRL/2965] A later Red Cross Society report (November 1916) noted that acknowledgements from Australian POWs in Turkey for food parcels delivered, were not received “under about four or five months”. [NAA: MP472/1, 5/19/2520] Delivery of mail items were known to take a relatively long time. At times, Turkish authorities imposed restrictions on the mail service: for example, later in 1915 private parcels were not being delivered and letter length to and from AE2 POWs was limited to four lines only (letter length restriction lifted in 1916). [NAA: MP472/1, 5/18/9207]

Clothing was a major source of concern. Wheat wrote of the weather in December 1915: it was “so extremely cold and wet that more clothing had to be issued to us.” [AWM: 3DRL/2965] As winter approached each year, British and Australian naval authorities organised clothing to be sent to AE2 POWs. Clothes supplied by the Admiralty, were “forwarded privately” to AE2 POWs by support organisations. This was desirable as it was believed that the enemy were confiscating supplies from “official sources” and therefore not reaching the prisoners. The Australian Naval Representative (London) reported on the supply of clothing in early 1916; he informed the Naval Board that it was organised through the “Ladies Committee of the Navy League”, which in turn used the Turkish Red Crescent societies for actual delivery in-country. [NAA: MP472/1, 5/19/2520]

Opportunities for escape exercises the minds of AE2 POWs. Wheat made two unsuccessful attempts with other AE2 crewmen: the first from Belemedik with Nichols lasted nineteen days (August 1916); the second with Stoker, James Cullen and an AIF Private from Gelebek in 1918. [AWM: 3DRL/2965] Wheat explained his feelings on the thought of escape in his personal account:

“The failure of my first attempt and the consequent punishment only made me more desperate...There seemed to be no end to the war. In fact, it seemed to be getting further away. It was as well to attempt an escape as die of fever, if we remained in the Camp ... [our] temper was often at the breaking point...It was only the hope of escaping that kept us up at all during that wretched persecution which lasted nearly five months whilst we were collecting material for our collapsible boat.” [AWM: 3DRL/2965]

Stoker made two escape attempts during his captivity: the first from Afion Kara Hissar in 1916, and the second from Yozgat in 1918. Before his first attempt, Stoker was warned by a senior Russian officer that his escape may cause trouble for the remainder of the Allied POWs and result in execution for himself, if recaptured. In response Stoker wrote two notes (one secretly to the American Ambassador and one to the camp commandant) indicating his intentions. In the hope of avoiding execution if captured, he advised that he was only performing his duty to escape; no civil crime would be committed; and he would not resist arrest if found.[3] Leading Signalman Albert Thomson and Stoker Charles Suckling also attempted escape. [4] For all except Stoker’s 1918 escape attempt, starvation and physical exhaustion played a large part in their failure.[5] [AWM: 3DRL/2965]

War’s end for AE2 prisoners came with the armistice on November 11, 1915. Nichols recalled the moment of leaving the St. Stefano POW camp:

“On...November 1918...we read that the armistice with Turkey had been concluded, and the following morning in spite of the protests of our Commander, we walked out of the camp and caught the train for Constantinople.” [AWM: 3DRL/2965]

With AE2 prisoners dispersed across Turkey, repatriation was not a straight forward process. For the most part, crewman headed for London. How they got there would depend on their location in Turkey. Australian naval authorities kept both the next of kin and the public updated on the movements of the repatriated men. Information was not always forthcoming; resulting in names ‘coming through “piece-meal” – a few at a time’. [NAA: MP472/1, 5/19/2825] Interested relatives wrote to naval authorities seeking clarification on their loved ones’ movements. Lack of information over time did cause concern for some relatives. Five months after the armistice an “anxious Mother” Mrs Cullen wrote to the Navy Office, Melbourne, asking them to ensure her son James did not “sign on [for] any more service but come home soon as possible”. [NAA: MP472/1, 5/19/2825] In reply, the Navy Office could assure her that James Cullen had arrived in London and were now enquiring of details for his passage home to Australia – in their opinion there was “no need for anxiety”. [NAA: MP472/1, 5/19/2825] After three and a half years as POWs, members of the AE2 crew would finally be reunited with those waiting for them at home. Nichol’s joy and relief almost leaps off the page in his personal account: “At length we got clear of Turkey and as the land gradually dipped below the horizon we felt that an awful nightmare of our lives had at last passed and that soon we would be among our friends.” [AWM: 3DRL/2965]

Unfortunately, four of AE2's crew would not be returning, their bodies remain interred in foreign soil. Since their deaths in 1916, the Navy Office had been liaising with the various next of kin, settling financial matters and answering a range of questions from the bereaved. Tanya Luckins, in her study of bereavement and memories of loss in the First World War, claims that the absence of a body to bury has profound consequences for a grieving family. [6] Firstly, it deprived them of a focus whereby they could clarify, accept and grieve over a death; secondly, no formal funeral rites could be conducted locally, leaving an unfulfilled sense of closure on the person’s life; finally, the family would not have a grave site to visit and tend over time.[7]

In this context, the deceased’s personal effects were eagerly sought after by next of kin, providing a means to stimulate fond memories.[8] Following official notification of Petty Officer Stephen Gilbert’s death in January 1917, his widow requested a copy of his death certificate and a duplicate of his “Long Service Medal” owing to the fact that the original had been “lost” when AE2 went down. Mrs Gilbert explained the reason for the medal request: “that being the only thing I shall have belonging to him”. [NAA: MP472/1, 5/20/10349] In a 12 November, 1918 letter to the Naval Secretary in Melbourne, the Australian Naval Representative (London) could report the receipt of a “Long Service and Good Conduct Medal” from the Admiralty for despatch to Mrs Gilbert. [NAA: MP472/1, 5/20/10349] In another request of the Navy Office, Mrs Williams asked if a photo of her son’s grave could be furnished. [NAA: MP472/1, 5/19/2520] Luckins believes it was important for the bereaved to know that their loved one’s grave was being cared for, particularly when they could not attend to it themselves.[9]After much investigation, the body of Stoker Michael Williams could not be found. Depositions from fellow patients at the hospital where he died (Pozanti) suggest Williams body had been removed byTurkish officials to an unknown location. [NAA: MP472/1, 5/19/2520] In a letter written to the then Australian Prime Minister Mr Hughes on 1 September 1919, William's mother lamented: “my son was buried as A Turk. Which is hard on true Britishers.” [NAA: MP472/1, 5/19/2520] The remaining deceased AE2 POWs – Varcoe, Gilbert, and Knaggs – had their bodies identified and were initially buried in the Belemedik Christian Cemetery; later, their bodies were reinterred by the Imperial War Graves Committee in the official Baghdad North Gate Cemetery. An engraved memorial to Williams can be found in this cemetry.[10]

Picture of the list of personnel ex submarine AE2 prisoners of war in Turkey
List of personnel ex submarine AE2 prisoners of war in Turkey
[NAA: MP472/1, 5/20/10349]

Following news of AE2’s “deplorable loss”, expressions of “sincere sympathy with the Australian Navy by all Departments of the Admiralty” were received by the Australian Naval Representative (London). In June 1915 he included an extract from one letter “that best indicates the general feeling” to the Naval Board in Melbourne: it read ‘“I am so very sorry to think that the R.A.N. has lost both their Submarines but “AE2” has covered herself with honour during her brief career”.’ [NAA: MP472/1, 5/19/2520] Stoker outlined a remarkable set of achievements in his autobiography: in her short service life AE2had travelled “35,000 miles, of which a greater portion was under war conditions. The first submarine to travel half-way round the world, she all but completed the journey. The first submarine to pass through the Dardanelles, to her fell the honour of proving this aforethought impossibility possible.”[11] However, several sources comment on the lack of wider recognition or due attention paid to AE2’s feat in the Dardanelles.[12] The discovery of AE2 in 1998 has provided a tangible reminder of an Australian naval presence at Gallipoli. Through the work of the Submarine Institute of Australia and the Turkish Institute of Nautical Archaeology – with government cooperation – there has been a greater impetus on protecting, preserving and publicising the story of AE2.[13] Kinder’s sobering words remind us of the precariousness of life as a submariner in the First World War era:

“Accidents were frequently happening to the Submarines in the early stages as they were practically still in their experimental stage when war broke out, and could not be relied on, and one was in nearly as much danger of losing one life in peace time as war time. There were many submariners lost while I was in England, and the Australians had their share of narrow escapes while undergoing training.” [AWM: PR01466]

In his autobiography published in 1925, Lieutenant-Commander Stoker wrote of the crew of AE2:

“In the writing of this record [published personal account] of their work I have risked the charge of ingratitude through, in many places, belittling the difficulties they had to overcome...The statements are true, but in the periods of time covered by such simple words the crew worked like slaves. Hard work, privation, discomfort, dangers, were their companions during practically the whole of AE2’s short life. And, if that were not enough, they entered, at her death, on a new life which was not a life, but a sorry existence. Good comrades, loyal servants, and brave men.”[14]

go to previous mission narrative

References:

  1. ^ a Frame, T. (2000). The Shores of Gallipoli: Naval Aspects of the ANZAC Campaign. Alexandria. Hale & Iremonger. p. 114.
  2. ^ a White, M.W.D. (1992). Australian Submarines: A History. Canberra. AGPS. p. 73: Chief Stoker C. Varcoe died of meningitis (18 September 1916); Petty Officer S.J. Gilbert died of typhus (9 October 1916); Able Seaman A.E. Knaggs died of typhus (22 October 1916); Stoker M.W. Williams died of malaria (?) (exact date & circumstances of death not fully known – fixed by Department of the Navy at 30 September 1916).
  3. ^ a Brenchley, F. and Brenchley, E. (2001). Stoker’s Submarine. Sydney. Harper Collins. pp. 140-145.
  4. ^ a Ibid., pp. 234-235 & 231-232.
  5. ^ a Ibid., pp.162-163.
  6. ^ a Luckins, T. (2004). The Gates of Memory: Australian People’s Experiences and Memories of Loss and the Great War. North Freemantle. Curtin University Books..
  7. ^ a Ibid., pp. 14-15
  8. ^ a Ibid., p.135.
  9. ^ a Ibid., pp. 151-152
  10. ^ a Brenchley, F. and Brenchley, E. (2001). op. cit., pp. 218, 225, 236 & 241.
  11. ^ a Stoker, H.G. (1925). Straws in the Wind. London. Herbert Jenkins. p. 140.
  12. ^ a Brenchley, F. and Brenchley, E. (2001). op. cit., pp. 194-195; Frame, T. (2000). op. cit., pp. 135-136 & 211-212; Brodie, C.G. (1956). Forlorn Hope 1915: The Submarine Passage of the Dardanelles. London. Frederick Books. p. 89.
  13. ^ a SIA/TUNA Workshop on Future Management of HMAS AE2. Instanbul, 26-27 APRIL 2008: Outcomes and Recommendations; SIA (AE2CF)/TUNA. Report of Operation ANZAC: Maritime Archaeological Assessment of HMAS AE2.
  14. ^ a Stoker, H.G. (1925). op. cit., p. 141.